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JURISDICTION 
First Security Leasing Company (MFirst Security-) agrees 
with Appellant Russell W. Sanderson ("Sanderson") that this Court 
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Whether the district court correctly concluded that 
First Security's Operations Procedures Manual and certain alleged 
oral assurances did not demonstrate an intent by First Security to 
alter Sanderson's established at-will employment to terminate only 
for cause or to continue employment for a specified period. 
B. Whether the district court correctly concluded that 
Utah does not recognize a cause of action for violation of a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in implied employment 
contracts. 
C. Whether the district court correctly concluded that 
even if Sanderson could establish that the alleged oral assurances 
constitute an implied employment contract, he is not entitled to 
recover damages for emotional distress under a contract claim. 
D. Whether the district court properly allowed the 
filing of Sanderson's deposition to allow consideration thereof on 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
First Security is in general agreement with Sanderson's 
Statement of the Case. As will be discussed below, however, First 
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Security does not agree that Sanderson is entitled to recover 
damages for emotional distress, nor does First Security agree that 
the district court did not have before it the relevant portions of 
Sanderson's deposition, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sanderson was hired by First Security Leasing in October 
of 1980. In 1984, he became manager of the Equipment Services 
Division and of the Account Services Department. (Sanderson 
Depo., pp. 53-55, R. 311.) Sanderson never had a written 
employment agreement with First Security Leasing. 
During Sanderson's employment at First Security, 
Sanderson received an Employee Benefits Handbook entitled 
••Benefits and Policies Overview" (hereinafter referred to as the 
-Employee Benefits Handbook"). (Sanderson depo., pp. 236-37, 
R. 311.) Throughout his employment at First Security Sanderson 
had access to the Employee Benefits Handbook. (Sanderson depo., 
p. 237, R. 311.) Page 6 of the Employee Benefits Handbook, under 
a section heading entitled "Employment Duration," provides as 
follows: 
Employment with First Security is 'at-will' 
employment and is, therefore, not for any fixed 
period of time. Your employment with First 
1A copy of the pertinent provisions of the Employee Benefits 
Handbook, Record Pages 80-81, is attached as Exhibit "A". 
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SfiCUritv is at the will and discretion of First 
Security enfl may be terminated at any time by 
First Security or by you as an employee. 
(Exhibit T , p. 6, emphasis added.) Sanderson understood the 
language quoted above to mean that First Security Leasing could 
dismiss him at any time just as he could quit at any time. 
(Sanderson depo., p. 238, R. 311.) 
During his employment at First Security Leasing, 
Sanderson also received and read a handbook entitled "First 
Security Standards for Employee Conduct" (hereinafter referred to 
as the "Standards Handbook").2 Page 5 of the Standards Handbook, 
under a section heading entitled "General Statement of Policy," 
provides as follows: 
Employment with First Security is 'at-will' 
employment and is, therefore, not for any fixed 
period of time. Your employment with First 
Security is at the wjXl and discretion of First 
Security and may be ended at any time by First 
Security or by you as an employee. 
(Exhibit "B", p. 5, emphasis added.) 
On an annual basis, First Security employees were 
required to sign a "Statement of Compliance with Standards" 
certifying that: 
(1) I have fully read and understand First 
Security's Standards for Employee Conduct, PER-91. . . . 
^A copy of the pertinent provisions of the Standards Handbook, 
Record Pages 83-84, is attached as Exhibit "B". 
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Sanderson signed his most recent "Statement of Compliance with 
Standards" on April 25, 1988.3 
Sanderson understood from the above-quoted paragraphs of 
the Standards Handbook that he did not have an employment contract 
for any specific period and that First Security Leasing could 
terminate him at any time. (Sanderson Depo., pp. 242-244, 
R. 311.) Moreover, neither the Employee Benefits Handbook nor the 
Standards Handbook provides, nor was Sanderson ever informed, that 
his employment at First Security Leasing was for a specific period 
of time or that he would be terminated only for cause or only 
after following certain termination procedures. (See Exhibits "A" 
and MBW.) 
Between September of 1988 and May of 1989, Sanderson was 
hospitalized approximately six times. He rarely came to work. 
(Sanderson Depo., pp. 162, 173-74, R. 311.) During that time 
period, neither Sanderson nor First Security Leasing knew from 
week to week when he would return to work full time. (Sanderson 
Depo., p. 178, R. 311.) Sanderson was relieved of his respon-
sibilities as Account Service Manager in December 1988, and in 
3A copy of that Statement of Compliance with Standards, Record 
Page 86, is attached as Exhibit f,C". 
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April 1989, Gary Judd ("Judd") was given responsibility for 
Equipment Services. (Sanderson Depo., p. 340, R. 311,) 
In April 1989, Judd, assisted by others, performed an 
audit of Equipment Services and located numerous problems both 
with reports that had been filed as well as procedures followed by 
those in that department under Sanderson's direction. Because 
Sanderson refused to commit to any time when he would return to 
work, and because Sanderson claimed he was presently under a lot 
of stress, First Security Leasing offered to transfer Sanderson to 
another position. Sanderson refused the transfer.4 (Sanderson 
Depo. pp. 225-28, R. 311.) 
The Operations Procedures Manual section which Sanderson 
contends creates an implied contract (O.P. 6-5.2) merely contains 
guidelines which First Security Leasing management may follow at 
its discretion when dealing with disciplinary problems: 
POLICY 
1. First Security follows the Managing 
for Improvement Procedure as a guideline for 
disciplinary action taken by management for all 
^In both the Statement of Facts and the Argument, Sanderson makes 
much of the dispute between the parties regarding (1) whether 
Sanderson quit or was terminated or (2) whether there was cause 
for Sanderson's termination. Those issues are simply not relevant 
to this appeal. The only issue is whether Sanderson was an 
at-will employee who could be terminated without cause. 
-5-
First Security employees. . . . (Emphasis 
added.)5 
In addition, O.P. 6-5.2 provides that the termination procedures 
set forth therein need not be followed depending on the 
circumstances: 
TERMINATION GUIDELINES 
6. In situations where employee behavior 
warrants immediate termination, the stages of 
this process do not need to be followed. 
Termination of these cases must be approved by 
the appropriate Division/Subsidiary Head Office. 
(Exhibit "D", If 6. ) 
Sanderson concedes that there is nothing in O.P. 6-5.2 
that assures that the disciplinary guidelines are mandatory. 
Instead, Sanderson contends only that in his experience those 
guidelines have been followed with respect to involuntarily 
terminated First Security Leasing employees. (Sanderson Depo., 
p. 256, 347-355, R. 311.) Sanderson named four employees he 
believed were terminated pursuant to O.P. 6-5.2. (ill.) A review 
of the files of the four named individuals shows that only one of 
the four were subject to the guidelines of O.P. 6-5.2. (Affidavit 
of T. D. Edmunds, Tlf 3-7, R. 91-94; Supplemental Affidavit of 
T. D. Edmunds, If 4, R. 108-115.) 
DA copy of O.P. 6-5.2, Record Pages 88-90 and 139-141, is attached 
as Exhibit "DM. 
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Sanderson also relies on alleged "assurances" given by 
C. S. "Bud" Cummings (-Cummings") that Sanderson could "take all 
the time [he] needed, do whatever needed to be done. When [he] 
was ready to come back, the job would be there." (Sanderson 
Depo., p. 244, R. 311.) Sanderson cannot remember the specifics 
of the assurances allegedly made by Cummings or when or where they 
were made. (Sanderson Depo., pp. 244, 246, 254, R. 311.) 
Cummings did not specifically assure Sanderson of a particular 
job. (Sanderson Depo., pp. 244-45, R. 311.) Moreover, the 
assurances were allegedly made by Cummings during a period of time 
in which Sanderson was explaining to Cummings his concerns about 
his medical and emotional problems. (Sanderson Depo., p. 339, 
R. 311.) 
In this contract action, Sanderson seeks, in reliance on 
the alleged oral assurances, to recover the tort damages of mental 
and emotional distress, anxiety and depression, mental anguish, 
damages to his name and reputation, and loss of benefits. 
(Complaint, If 21, R. 6-7.) Sanderson has not asserted (nor could 
he successfully do so) a claim for intentional or negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. (Complaint, R. 2-10.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE THAT FIRST SECURITY LEASING 
COMPANY AND SANDERSON INTENDED TO CREATE A CONTRACT FOR A 
SPECIFIC TERM OR AGREED TO TERMINATE THEIR RELATIONSHIP 
FOR CAUSE ALONE. 
In this action, Sanderson contends that his established 
at-will employment relationship with First Security Leasing was 
altered by (a) a section of First Security Leasing's Operating 
Procedures Manual and (b) alleged oral assurances by a First 
Security Leasing employee. To avoid summary judgment Sanderson 
was required to show that the manuals and/or assurances 
"demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause or to continue 
employment for a specified period.'* Berube v. Fashion Centre, 
Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989). Sanderson failed to meet 
that burden. 
A. The Handbooks Clearly And Unequivocally Provide That 
Sanderson Was An At-Will Employee. 
The intent of First Security and Sanderson concerning 
Sanderson's employment-at-will status is clearly and unequivocally 
spelled out in the handbooks he received. Sanderson acknowledged 
in writing on an annual basis that he understood that there was 
not a contract between him and First Security and that he could be 
terminated at any time. Therefore, there is no reasonable basis 
for Sanderson to conclude that First Security intended to create 
any employment relationship other than an at-will relationship. 
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B. The Discretionary Guidelines For Discipline In Thg 
Operations Procedures Manual Po Not Alter Sanderson's 
At-will status. 
Unless the language of a handbook or procedures manual is 
mandatory and clearly promises that specific disciplinary proce-
dures will be followed, the handbook or procedures manual does not 
and should not create contractual rights in the plaintiff. O.P. 
6-5.2 merely suggests discretionary guidelines which may be used 
when dealing with discipline problems. Moreover, O.P. 6-5.2 
provides that the procedure set forth therein need not be followed 
depending on the circumstances. Therefore, even if the guidelines 
were part of an implied employment contract, O.P. 6-5.2 does not 
alter Sanderson's at-will status. 
C. The Alleged Oral Statements Are Far From A "Clear And 
Unequivocal" Offer Of Continued Or Specified Employment. 
Sanderson has the burden of establishing that the alleged 
oral assurances are not simply encouragement or optimism, but 
instead constitute a "clear and unequivocal" offer by First 
Security Leasing of (a) employment for a specified period of time 
or (b) that he would be terminated only for cause. 
Sanderson has not come forward with any evidence which 
even suggests that First Security made him an offer of employment 
for a specified period or that he would be terminated only for 
cause. He concedes that First Security Leasing did not offer him 
either lifetime employment or employment for any specified 
duration. Sanderson does not contend that any assurance was made 
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that he would be terminated only for cause. The extent of the 
oral assurances upon which Sanderson relies is simply that when he 
recovered from his medical and emotional problems Hthe job would 
be there." The statements of Cummings, even if made, amount only 
to encouragement and optimism and do not rise to the level of an 
offer for a specified period of employment. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED SANDERSON'S BREACH OF 
CONTRACT/WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
First Security has established by uncontroverted evidence 
that O.P. 6-5.2 is discretionary and does not promise that any 
specific disciplinary procedures will be followed, and that the 
alleged oral assurances do not contain any of the essential terms 
of a contractual offer for continued employment. Sanderson, 
therefore, has the burden of showing by specific facts that First 
Security intended to alter his at-will employment status. As he 
has not come forward with any such evidence, the district court 
was correct in granting summary judgment. 
III. UTAH HAS NOT RECOGNIZED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF A 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS. 
Berube and several subsequent Utah decisions have made it 
clear that MUtah law does not recognize a cause of action for 
violation of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing" in 
employment contracts. Loose v. Nature-All Corporation, 785 P.2d 
1096, 1098 (Utah 1989). 
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IV. DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER 
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIM. 
In Berube, the court recognized that actions such as 
Sanderson's are actions in contract. Therefore, Sanderson is not 
entitled to recover mental distress or the other similar tort 
damages sought unless he alleges and proves an independent claim 
for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. As 
Sanderson has not even asserted such claims, nor could he 
establish the requisite elements of such claims, the district 
court correctly found that he is not entitled to recover damages 
for mental distress. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN ALLOWING THE FILING OF 
SANDERSON'S DEPOSITION. 
For a number of reasons, the district court correctly 
allowed the filing of Sanderson's deposition, even though First 
Security cited but did not attach pages of that deposition to its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. First, under the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, First Security had the option of either 
citing to or attaching the deposition pages relied upon. 
Sanderson had the opportunity below to object to, refute or 
explain those citations. To the extent he did not, the district 
court was entitled to rely upon First Security's statements of 
fact as being accurate reflections of Sanderson's deposition 
transcript. 
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In addition, Sanderson's deposition must be filed before 
any portion of that deposition may be considered by an appellate 
court. If the deposition had not been filed, Sanderson would have 
absolutely no evidence before either the district court or this 
Court that First Security intended to alter his at-will employment 
status, as he relies solely on his deposition to support his claim. 
Finally, even if it were necessary to provide the 
district court with the relevant pages of Sanderson's deposition, 
all of the deposition pages and other documents First Security 
relied upon regarding every material issue in the Motion for 
Summary Judgment were attached to either First Security's or 
Sanderson's memorandum and provided to the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE THAT FIRST SECURITY LEASING 
COMPANY AND SANDERSON INTENDED TO CREATE A CONTRACT FOR A 
SPECIFIC TERM OR AGREED TO TERMINATE THEIR RELATIONSHIP 
FOR CAUSE ALONE. 
In this action, Sanderson contends that his established 
at-will employment relationship with First Security Leasing was 
altered by (a) a section of First Security Leasing's Operating 
Procedures Manual ("O.P. 6-5.2") and (b) alleged oral assurances 
by a First Security Leasing employee. In support of his claim, 
Sanderson relies on Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
1033 (Utah 1989), the case in which this Court recognized that 
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employment manuals and oral assurances mayb demonstrate the 
parties' intent to change an employee's at-will status• 
This court specifically held in Berube, however, that the 
presumption of at-will employment may be overcome only if the 
plaintiff carries the burden of showing that the manuals and/or 
assurances "demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause or 
to continue employment for a specified period." IsL. at 1044. In 
determining whether the parties intended to agree to terminate the 
relationship for cause alone, traditional requirements of contract 
formation are applied. As a result, the plaintiff must show more 
than "subjective understandings or expectations." Rose v. Allied 
Development Co., 719 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1986). Instead, the 
written or oral assurances relied upon must indicate "a clear 
intention on the employer's part to surrender its . . . power to 
terminate its employees at will." Butterfield v. Citibank of 
South Dakota, N.A., 437 N.W.2d 857, 859 (S.D. 1989); see Berube, 
771 P.2d at 1044 ("employment contracts should be construed to 
give effect to the intent of the parties"); Rose, 719 P.2d at 86. 
throughout his brief, Sanderson suggests that Berube established 
that employee handbooks always give rise to binding implied-in-
fact contracts. To the contrary, Berube holds that in very 
limited circumstances manuals may give rise to an implied 
contract, i.e., only if such manuals show the intent of the 
parties to alter the employment-at-will relationship and to 
terminate only for cause or to continue employment for a specified 
period. 
-13-
The district court below correctly concluded that the 
evidence, as a matter of law, was insufficient that First Security 
and Sanderson intended to create a contract for a specified term 
or to terminate their relationship for cause alone. To the 
contrary, First Security's Employee Benefits Handbook and 
Standards Handbook clearly and unambiguously show the intent of 
the parties that Sanderson was an at-will employee who could be 
dismissed with or without cause at any time, Sanderson's 
established employment-at-will status was not altered or amended 
by either the Operations Procedures Manual or the alleged oral 
assurances. The Operations Procedures Manual merely provides 
discretionary guidelines to supervisory personnel which may be 
followed by management in addressing discipline problems. The 
alleged oral assurances that Sanderson's job "would be there" when 
he overcame his mental and emotional problems fall well short of 
being an unequivocal contractual offer for employment for a 
specified period, or an offer to terminate only for cause which 
could alter Sanderson's at-will employment. 
A. The Handbooks Clearly And Unequivocally Provide That 
Sanderson Was An At-Will Employee. 
The intent of First Security and Sanderson concerning 
Sanderson' employment-at-will status is set forth clearly in the 
Employee Benefits Handbook and the Standards Handbook he 
received. The Employee Benefits Handbook states: 
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EMPLOYMENT DURATION 
Employment with First Security is 'at-will' 
employment and is, therefore, not for any fixed 
period of time. Your employment with First 
Security is at the will and discretion of First 
Security and may be terminated at any time by 
First Security or by you as an employee. 
(Exhibit "A", p. 6, emphasis added.) 
Likewise, the Standards Handbook provides: 
There may be occasions when First Security 
must change rules or give current rules a 
different interpretation than previously made. 
First Security has the right to modify 
policies, both written and unwritten. 
* * * 
Employment with First Security is 
•at-will' and is, therefore, not for any fixed 
period of time. Your employment is at the will 
ended at any time by First Security or by you 
as an employee. 
(Exhibit MB", p. 5, emphasis added.) 
On an annual basis, Sanderson signed statements acknow-
ledging that he read and understood the Standards Handbook. In 
addition, Sanderson testified at his deposition that he understood 
from the Standards Handbook that there was not a contract between 
him and First Security Leasing, that he could be terminated at any 
time, and that First Security had the right to modify any of its 
procedures: 
Q. [Ms. Smith] I'd like you to turn to page 
five, which is the general statement of 
policy in the First Security standards for 
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employment conduct. I'd like you to look 
at the third paragraph down. I'd like you 
to read that aloud for the record? 
[Mr. Sanderson] [Reads first paragraph of 
the Standards Handbook quoted above.] 
What is your understanding of that 
paragraph? 
[Objection by Mr. Wycoff to the form of 
the question.] 
Well, I think basically it speaks for 
itself. As I can see it First Security 
has the right to change policy. 
It also says that you don't have a 
contract with First Security doesn't it? 
[Objection by Mr. Wygoff to the form of 
the question.] 
That's what it says. 
Look at the next paragraph. 
Okay. 
What does that say? 
It brings up "at will" again. 
What does it say. Read it? 
[Reads second paragraph of the Standards 
Handbook quoted above.] 
It says your employment may be ended at 
any time by First Security, correct? 
That's what it says. 
What is your understanding of that? 
[Objection by Mr. Wycoff to the form of 
the question.] 
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A. It tells me according to the sentence that 
they can terminate me at any time. 
Q. Just as you can quit at any time? 
A. At any time? Yes. 
Q. You signed a statement saying you read and 
understood this manual, correct? 
A. I did. 
(Sanderson Depo., pp. 241-243, R. 178-180, 311.) 
Having acknowledged that he read and understood that his 
employment with First Security was at-will, there is no reasonable 
basis for Sanderson to conclude that First Security would 
terminate him only for cause or that First Security Leasing 
intended to create any employment relationship other than 
at-will. See e.g. Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970, 
974 (6th Cir. 1987) (relying on a similar "sign off sheet" in 
which plaintiff acknowledged that his employment was at-will). 
B. TheJDiscr&,tiQnaryJlul<3elines FojL.DisgijS.line_InJThe 
Operations Procedures Manual Do Not Alter Sanderson's 
At-Will Status. 
Notwithstanding his acknowledgement that he read »nd 
understood the Standards Handbook, Sanderson contends that O.P. 
6-5.2 gives him the contractual right to be discharged only 
pursuant to the discipline guidelines provided. Unless the 
language of a handbook or procedures manual is mandatory and 
clearly promises that specific disciplinary procedures will be 
followed, however, the handbook or procedures manual does not and 
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should not create contractual rights in the plaintiff. See 
Tolbert v. St. Francis Extended Care Center, 545 N.E.2d 384, 386 
(111. Ct. App. 1989). 
Procedures which are merely "guidelines" simply do not 
create an implied contract that those procedures will be followed 
in all cases or indicate an intent by the employer to give up its 
right to terminate at-will. See Butterfield v. Citibank of South 
Dakota, 437 N.W.2d 857, 859-60 (S.D. 1989) (language of a handbook 
permitting Citibank to discharge employees without notice in 
-appropriate instances" was found to reflect the at-will status of 
its employees); Shah v. General Electric Company, 697 F. Supp. 
946, 948 (D. Kentucky 1988); Mursch v. Van Porn Co., 851 F.2d 990, 
995 (7th Cir. 1988) (the court found that w[i]n contrast to the 
repeated mandatory and unambiguous language in the Hyatt Handbook 
• . . the provisions of Mursch*s employment manual are expressly 
denominated as 'guidelines' and are couched in permissive 
language.") 
The rationale for not construing guidelines to create 
contractual rights is explained in Vancheri v. GNLV Corp., 777 
P.2d 366, 369-70 (Nev. 1989): 
Standardized disciplinary procedures are 
generally positive additions to a business. They 
provide employers a method of cautioning employees, 
and afford employees an opportunity to improve job 
performance in order to retain employment. They 
also create a general consistency and security in 
the work place. If we were to hold that the 
establishment of standard disciplinary procedures 
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is, in and of itself, sufficient to convert an 
at-will employee to an employee who could be fired 
only for cause, employers would be reluctant to 
continue to establish them. 
Based upon the law and policy considerations, 
we hold that general expressions of job longevity 
and advancement and the established disciplinary 
procedure as described in this case, are not, as a 
matter of law, sufficient to establish a prima 
LaQijLJiase rebutting that at-will employment 
presumption. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Sanderson does not challenge the above authority7, but 
instead contends that the discipline guidelines in O.P. 6-5.2 are 
mandatory. In so contending, Sanderson relies on (a) the language 
of O.P. 6-5.2; (b) his -belief that the procedures of O.P. 6-5.2 
were mandatory; and (c) his contention that O.P. 6-5.2 was 
'Sanderson discusses Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) and Arnold v. B.J. Titan Services 
Company, 783 P.2d 541 (Utah 1989). Neither case discusses the 
distinction between mandatory and discretionary termination 
procedures, and neither case suggests that discretionary 
guidelines such as O.P. 6-5.2 indicate an intent to alter at-will 
employment status. In Piacitelli, the issue of whether a 
personnel manual created contractual rights in the plaintiff was 
not even before the Utah Supreme Court on appeal and the Court 
expressly declined to express an opinion on whether the trial 
court's conclusion on that issue was appropriate. 636 P.2d at 
1065 n.2. Moreover, in Arnold, the termination procedures 
involved were expressed in mandatory language and, contrary to 
O.P. 6-5.2, there was no indication in the Arnold opinion that the 
employer had discretion as to whether to apply the procedures or 
whether the employer had clearly set forth its intent not to alter 
the at-will status of its employees, as First Security has done. 
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followed with respect to other employees who were involuntarily 
terminated. Sanderson's contentions are simply contrary to fact. 
1. By Its Terms, The Disciplinary Guidelines of O.P. 
6-5.2 Are Discretionary And Need Not Be Followed In 
All Circumstances. 
Without explanation, Sanderson states that the language 
of O.P. 6-5.2 is mandatory. By its express terms, however, O.P. 
6-5.2 merely suggests discretionary guidelines which may be used 
when dealing with disciplinary problems: 
POLICY 
First Security follows the managing for 
improvement procedure as- a guideline for 
disciplinary action taken by management for all 
First Security employees^ (Emphasis addend.) 
More importantly, the section of O.P. 6-5.2 which 
addresses employee termination is expressly denominated as a 
"guideline" and provides that the procedure set forth therein need 
not be followed depending on the gjrcumgtgnceg: 
TERMINATION GUIDELINES 
6. In situations where employee behavior 
warrants immediate termination, the stages of 
this process do not need to be followed. 
Termination of these cases must be approved by 
the appropriate Division/Subsidiary Head Office. 
The discipline steps set out in O.P. 6-5.2 are simply not 
mandatory- The policy is denominated as a guideline, is couched 
in permissive language, and the language clearly allows for 
immediate termination in management's discretion with proper 
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approval. It is undisputed that proper approval was given for 
Sanderson's termination, Sanderson's claim that O.P. 6-5.2 is by 
its terms mandatory is unfounded. 
2. Sanderson's Subjective Understanding That O.P. 6-5.2 
Was Mandatory Is Not Sufficient To Overcome His 
At-Will Employment Status. 
Sanderson argues, in essence, that Mas far as he was 
concerned" O.P. 6-5.2 was mandatory. To overcome the presumption 
of employment at-will, however, Sanderson must show more than his 
"subjective understandings or expectations." Rose, 719 P.2d at 86 
(Utah 1986). Instead, he must show that O.P. 6-5.2 contains "a 
clear intention on [First Security Leasing's] part to surrender 
its . . . power to terminate its employees at will," Butterfield 
v. Citibank of South Dakota, N.A., 437 N.W.2d 857, 859 (S.D. 
1989); see also Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044; and Rose, 719 P.2d at 86. 
O.P. 6-5.2 does not indicate any intention, let alone a 
"clear intention," to alter Sanderson's at-will employment 
status. Therefore, Sanderson's subjective understanding to the 
contrary is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
3. Sanderson's Experience Regarding The Termination Of 
Other First Security Leasing Company Employees 
Further Evidences That O.P. 6-5.2 Is A Discretionary 
Guideline. 
Sanderson relies on "his experience" that specific other 
First Security Leasing Company employees were involuntarily 
terminated pursuant to the guidelines of O.P. 6-5.2. During his 
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deposition, Sanderson identified four employees he claims were 
terminated pursuant to those procedures. A review of those 
individual's files demonstrates, however, that only one of the 
four individuals was terminated pursuant to those guidelines. 
(Affidavit of T. D. Edmunds, Wf 3-7, R. 91-94; Supplemental 
Affidavit of T. D. Edmunds, 1[ 4,# R. 108-115.) Sanderson now 
claims that he applied the procedures of O.P. 6-5.2 to "an" 
employee. The fact that the guidelines were only applied to some 
terminations but not others reinforces that O.P. 6-5.2 merely 
provides guidelines which First Security Leasing may follow at its 
discretion depending on the facts and circumstances of each 
situation. 
The district court correctly found that Sanderson 
produced absolutely no evidence that the discipline guidelines set 
forth in O.P. 6-5.2 are mandatory, and therefore, failed to meet 
the burden of showing that O.P. 6-5.2 evidences First Security 
Leasing Company's intent to alter his at-will employment status. 
Summary judgment was therefore appropriate under the standard 
established in Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
4. Even If the Discretionary Guidelines Are Part of An 
Implied Employment Contract, They Do Not Alter the 
At-Will Status of Sanderson. 
Sanderson cites Arnold v. B. J. Titan Services Company, 
783 P.2d 541 (Utah 1989) as establishing that the following test 
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should govern the Court's decision of this appeal: (1) whether 
the termination is made without adherence to the procedures set 
out in the operating manual; (2) whether the discharge violated 
the procedures set out in the operating manual; and (3) whether 
there was justification for not following the procedures. 
Sanderson also contends, in reliance on Arnold, that the Court 
should reverse the district court's summary judgment, direct that 
judgment be entered against First Security, and remand for a trial 
only on the issue of damages. Sanderson's reliance on Arnold is 
misplaced.8 
Unlike Arnold, the issue in this case is not whether 
First Security was justified in not following O.P. 6-5.2, but 
whether the discretionary guidelines of O.P. 6-5.2 alter 
b
 Arnold did not involve the question of whether B. J. Titan's 
termination procedures were mandatory or discretionary. The trial 
court concluded that Titan's procedures (which were expressed in 
mandatory language) governed Arnold's termination and that Titan 
failed to either follow those procedures or offer justification 
for failing to do so. The trial court dismissed Arnold's claim, 
however, on the basis that there was lack of assent and 
consideration between Arnold and B. J. Titan. 
On appeal, neither party attacked the trial court's findings. 
Thus, the only issue was whether there must have been "mutual 
assent or additional requisite consideration between Arnold and 
B. J. Titan regarding the procedures set forth in the operating 
manual." id. at 542. Because Berube, which was decided after the 
trial court's decision in Arnold, held that mutuality of assent 
and independent consideration were not required for 
implied-in-fact promises, the case was remanded for a hearing on 
the issues of damages, id. at 544. 
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Sanderson's at-will employment status. O.P. 6-5.2 is simply a 
discretionary guideline that expressly provides that First 
Security is not required to apply the guidelines in every 
instance. The district court was therefore correct in concluding 
that O.P. 6-5.2 did not evidence any intent on First Security's 
part to alter the employment-ati-will status of its employees even 
if the "guidelines" were part of an implied employment contract. 
The district court's conclusion is entirely consistent with this 
Court's concern in Berube that "due deference be paid to 
managerial discretion and normal employment decisions." Berube, 
711 P.2d at 1046 (recognizing also that the implied-in-fact 
contract exception to the presumption of at-will employment "will 
not eliminate the at-will construction of most employment 
contracts.") 
At the very least, if the Court were to find a factual 
issue as to whether O.P. 6-5.2 was mandatory it would be necessary 
to remand the factual issue as to whether this was sufficient to 
alter the at-will status, and whether First Security was justified 
in not following its procedures, for jury resolution along with 
the issue of damages. 
5. First Security Does Not Rely on the Statements of 
the Handbooks as "Disclaimers." 
In his brief, Sanderson discusses a number of 
-disclaimer" cases for the proposition that one may disclaim 
termination procedures only if the disclaimer is clear and 
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conspicuous. Sanderson argues that "First Security did not, and 
under Utah case law could not, disclaim its mandatory 
procedures." (Appellant's Brief, p. 25, emphasis added.) 
Sanderson misses the mark. First Security does not rely on the 
statements in the Benefits and Standards Handbooks as 
•'disclaimers.M Rather, the discretionary termination provisions 
of O.P. 6-5.2 do not alter the at-will relationship with First 
Security which is clearly and unequivocally established in 
writing, one of which was signed and attested to by Sanderson. As 
a result, there was nothing for First Security to "disclaim". 
Sanderson simply has not come forward with sufficient evidence 
demonstrating First Security's intent to alter its at-will 
relationship with its employees. Summary judgment was therefore 
appropriate under the Celotex standard. 
C. The Alleged Oral Statements Are Not A "Clear And 
Unequivocal" Offer Of Continued Or Specified Employment. 
In addition to O.P. 6-5.2, Sanderson claims that his 
employment-at-will status was altered by certain oral assurances 
by a First Security employee. Sanderson has the burden of estab-
lishing that the alleged oral assurances are not merely encour-
agement or optimism, but instead constitute a "clear and unequi-
vocal" offer by First Security Leasing of (a) employment for a 
specified period of time or (b) that he would be terminated only 
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for cause. See Mursch, 851 F.2d at 990- The reason for requiring 
a clear unequivocal offer is obvious: 
A casual remark made at a meeting, a 
phrase plucked out of context, is too fragile a 
base on which to rest such a heavy obligation 
inherent in such a contract. 
* * * 
[E]mployers and employees, like everyone 
else, sometimes speak in hyperbole to express 
their feelings of loyalty and friendship but 
without intent to invoke the heavy machinery of 
the law to enforce the literal meaning of these 
words. 
Id at 997-98. 
Sanderson has not come forward with any evidence which 
even suggests that First Security made him an offer of employment 
for a specified period or that he would be terminated only for 
cause. Sanderson concedes that First Security Leasing did not 
offer him either lifetime employment or employment for any 
specified duration. (Sanderson Depo., pp. 244-47, 355, R. 311.) 
Moreover, Sanderson does not contend that any assurance was made 
that he would be terminated only for cause or, for that matter, 
that the grounds for a possible termination where even mentioned. 
(Sanderson Depo., 244-47, R. 311.) In fact, the alleged 
assurances did not even specify a particular job. The extent of 
the oral assurances upon which Sanderson relies is simply that 
when he recovered from his medical and emotional problems "the job 
would be there." 
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The statements of Cummings, even if made, amount only to 
encouragement and optimism. Such general statements do not rise 
to the level of an offer for a specified period of employment. 
§_££ Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044-46 (the Court noted that due 
deference must be paid to management's discretion to have 
employment at-will, and held that the burden was on the employee 
to show an enforceable promise of employment for a specified 
duration or to limit the reasons for dismissal).^ 
The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Sanderson 
was an at-will employee and that neither First Security nor 
Sanderson intended to create other than an at-will relationship. 
Therefore, the district court was correct in dismissing 
Sanderson's breach of contract/wrongful discharge claim. 
ySe_e, also, Braiq v. Palace Company, 4 IER Cases 1264 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1989) (assurance that a position was secure Mas long as he 
performed well," absent a fixed duration, was found not to change 
at-will status); Merritt v. Edson Express, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 528, 
529-30 (S.D. 1989) (assurance that the job was there "as long as 
you want it" was found to be a general statement that did not 
change at-will status); Peters v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 
685 F. Supp. 411, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (statement that the 
plaintiff could "expect long-term employment" was found to be less 
specific than a promise of lifetime employment and did not change 
an employee's at-will status). 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED SANDERSON'S BREACH OF 
CONTRACT/WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In CelPtex Corp. vt Cstrett, 477 U,S, 317 (1986), the 
court clarified the proper allocation of the burden of proof on 
motions for summary judgment and made it clear that Rule 56 
mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial." X£l. at 322. 
When a movant does not carry the ultimate burden of 
persuasion on an issue at trial, the movant's burden is only one 
of production for purposes of a motion for summary judgment. The 
burden can be satisfied simply by showing that there is an absence 
of evidence to support the nonmovant's case. Then: 
Once the moving party has met its initial 
burden of production, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to designate 'specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial.' . . . The mere existence of a 
scintilla of evidence in support of the 
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; 
there must be evidence on which the jury could 
reasonably find for the plaintiff. 
Id. at 323. 
First Security has met its burden of production by 
establishing by competent evidence that O.P. 6-5.2 is 
discretionary and does not promise that any specific disciplinary 
procedures will be followed, and that the alleged oral assurances 
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do not contain any of the essential terms of a contractual offer 
for continued employment. Both the Employee Benefits Handbook and 
the Standards Handbook Sanderson received clearly and unequivo-
cally provide that Sanderson was an at-will employee. Sanderson 
knew from reading the Standards Handbook periodically that he 
could be terminated at any time. The burden was therefore upon 
Sanderson to show, by specific facts, that First Security intended 
to alter his at-will employment. As Sanderson did not come 
forward with any such evidence, the district court correctly 
concluded that First Security was entitled to summary judgment. 
III. UTAH HAS NOT RECOGNIZED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF A 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS. 
Sanderson contends that although Berube and several 
subsequent Utah decisions have refused to recognize a cause of 
action for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
employment contracts, the courts have not yet rejected that cause 
of action. In so contending, Sanderson relies on Lowe v. Sorenson 
Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989). Lowe does not even 
address the question at issue and does not stand for the 
proposition cited. 
In Lowe, the plaintiff, alleging that she was improperly 
terminated, asserted three tort theories against her employer. 
The district court, prior to Berube, granted the employer's Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In light of Berube, this court 
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vacated the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings, 
not on plaintiffs theory of breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing,10 but on an implied contract theory. The 
court, noting that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is only appropriate if 
plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged, found that 
"Lowe has stated such a claim for breach of contract." 
She claims generally that her discharge was in 
violation of the terms of a company manual that 
prescribed policies and procedures governing 
the discharge of employees. Construing these 
allegations in a light most favorable to Lowe, 
the facts support a claim for contract damages 
under Berube. 
Id. at 669-70 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, Lowe is consistent with Berube, Loose v. 
Nature-All Corporation, 785 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1989)11, and Caldwell 
v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah. Inc., 777 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989) 
in refusing to recognize liability for breach of a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in an implied-in-fact employment 
agreement. 
iUThere is no discussion in Lowe whatsoever regarding whether Utah 
recognizes a cause of action for breach of a covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
1
-'•Loose was decided after Lowe, and the court specifically 
addressed the issue of whether Utah recognizes a, cause of action 
for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In 
Loose, the court affirmed a judgment of dismissal "because Utah 
law does not recognize a cause of action for violation of a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Xd. at 1098. 
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IV. DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER 
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIM. 
Even assuming Sanderson had a valid claim against First 
Security Leasing for breach of an implied employment contract, 
Sanderson cannot recover for "mental and emotional distress, 
anxiety and depression, mental anguish and damages to his good 
name and reputation."12 Emotional distress and similar damages 
are not recoverable under a contract theory: 
[T]he general rule, with few exceptions, 
is to 'uniformly deny' recovery for mental 
distress damages although they are 'foreseeable 
within the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.' The 
rule barring recovery of mental distress 
damages — a gloss on the generality of the 
rule stated in Hadley v. Baxendale — is fully 
applicable to an action for breach of an 
employment contract. 
xzSanderson does not contend that mental distress damages were 
"reasonably contemplated by the parties" when the discretionary 
guidelines of O.P. 6-5.2 were put into effect. Sanderson relies 
solely on the alleged oral assurances in support of his claim for 
mental distress damages. As a result, if the Court finds that the 
alleged oral assurances as a matter of law were insufficient to 
create an implied contract, Sanderson's claim for emotional 
distress damages would necessarily fail. Moreover, Sanderson 
offers absolutely no evidence that mental distress damages were 
"reasonably within the contemplation of" the parties at the time 
the alleged oral assurances were made. See Berube, 771 P.2d at 
1050. Instead, Sanderson argues that such damages were reasonably 
foreseeable at the time the alleged implied contract was breached, 
i.e., the time First Security offered Sanderson a different 
position. Because Sanderson has not presented evidence that 
mental distress damages were contemplated "at the time the 
contract was made," his claim for such damages fails as a matter 
of law under Celotex. 
-31-
Valentine v. General American Credit, 362 N.W.2d 628, 630 (Mich. 
1984) (citing McCormick, Damages, § 163, p. 637-638 and cases 
cited therein). See also Fogleman vy Peruvian Associates*/ 622 
P.2d 63, 65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (the court denied recovery for 
emotional distress, anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation for 
breach of an employment contract because it recognized that mental 
distress and similar damages are not susceptible to computation 
and "cannot reasonably be presumed to have been within the contem-
plation of the parties when they entered into the contract"). 
In Berube, the court recognized that actions such as 
Sanderson's are actions in contract. Therefore, Sanderson is not 
entitled to recover mental distress or the other similar tort 
damages sought unless he alleges and proves an independent claim 
for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
See DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So.2d 134, 136 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1978). As Sanderson has not even asserted such 
claims, nor could he establish the requisite elements of such 
claims, the district court correctly found that he is not entitled 
to recover the damages sought. 
Moreover, other than stating that "it is not real easy to 
get fired" and claiming loss of self-esteem and confidence, 
Sanderson cannot state any manifestation of emotional distress he 
suffered as a result of his termination. (Sanderson Depo., 
pp. 368-69, R. 311.) He did not see doctors any more frequently 
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after termination than before. (Sanderson Depo., p. 361, 
R. 311.) Sanderson simply does not state any degree of mental 
distress other than that which results from any breach of 
contract, and which is uniformly denied as an element of contract 
damages. See Valentine, 362 N.W.2d at 630. Therefore, 
Sanderson's potential recovery is limited to contractual damages 
and recovery for mental distress and anguish is excluded. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN ALLOWING THE FILING OF 
SANDERSON'S DEPOSITION. 
A. First_Securifcy_kea-5inq Company Had The Option Of Either 
Citing To Or Attaching Copies Of The Deposition Pages 
Relied Upon. 
Sanderson argues that First Security Leasing Company was 
not entitled to have his deposition filed because it cited to but 
did not attach copies of the relevant pages of Sanderson's 
deposition. Under the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, First 
Security had the option of either citing to or attaching the 
deposition pages relied upon: 
All motions . . . shall be accompanied by a 
memorandum of points and authorities, 
appropriate affidavits and copies of or 
citations by page number to relevant portions 
of depositions, exhibits or other documents 
relied upon and in support of the motion. 
(Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule-501(1)(a), emphasis 
added.) 
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In its statement of uncontested facts below, First 
Security cited to and quoted from relevant pages of Sanderson's 
deposition. First Security also read from Sanderson's deposition 
during oral argument. Sanderson had the opportunity in his 
memorandum in opposition to and in oral argument to object to, 
refute or explain those citations. To the extent he did not, the 
district court was entitled to rely upon those statements of fact 
as being accurate reflections of Sanderson's deposition transcript. 
B. SandLerson's Deposition Must Be Filed With_The Court For 
Any Portion Qf Thgt Deposition TQ Be Considered Qn Appeal. 
In his attempt to keep his deposition from being filed, 
Sanderson argued below that only the deposition pages he attached 
to his memorandum in opposition should become part of the record 
on appeal. It is clear, however, that Sanderson's deposition must 
be filed before any portion of that deposition may be cited to or 
considered by an appellate court. Alford v. Utah League of Cities 
and Towns, 129 U.A.R. 49, 52 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (in 
resolving an appeal, an appellate court may not consider 
depositions which have not been filed with the district court"); 
see also Diaflon, Inc. v. The Allied Chem Corp., 534 F.2d 221, 
226-27 (10th Cir. 1976) (court on appeal may not properly consider 
depositions not filed with district court). 
Therefore, for either party to rely on Sanderson's 
deposition on appeal, the deposition must be filed. If the 
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deposition had not been filed, Sanderson would have absolutely no 
evidence before either the district court or this Court that First 
Security intended to alter his at-will employment status, as he 
relies solely on his deposition to support his claim. Therefore, 
the district court was correct in allowing the filing of 
Sanderson's deposition. 
C. In Any Event, The Relevant Pages Of Sanderson's 
Deposition Were Attached To Sanderson's Memorandum In 
Opposition. 
Even if it were necessary to provide the district court 
with the relevant pages of Sanderson's deposition, contrary to the 
clear wording of Rule 501(1)(a), those pages were attached as 
Exhibit "E" to Sanderson's memorandum in opposition. (Record 
Pages 162-198.) All of the deposition pages and other documents 
First Security relied upon regarding the following issues were 
attached to either First Security's or Sanderson's memorandum and 
provided to the district court: 
1. The provisions of the employment 
handbooks First Security Leasing Company 
provided to Sanderson (R. 80-81, 83-84); 
2. Sanderson's access to such handbooks 
(R. 174); 
3. Sanderson's understanding of the 
provisions of those handbooks (R. 175-81); 
4. Sanderson's certification statement 
acknowledging that he had read those provisions 
(R. 86); 
5. Sanderson's refusal of First Security 
Leasing Company's offer of transfer (R. 168-69); 
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6. The provisions of First Security-
Leasing Company's Operations Procedures Manual 
(R. 88-90 and 139-41); 
7. Sanderson's understanding of the 
provisions of the Operations Procedures Manual 
(R. 189-90); 
8. The alleged oral assurances First 
Security Leasing Company made to Sanderson 
(R. 181, 187); and 
9. The discussion regarding the specifics 
of those alleged oral assurances (R. 181, 187). 
The only deposition pages First Security cites to which 
were not attached to Sanderson's memorandum concern the background 
and other information not determinative of issues before the court 
in First Security Leasing Company's Motion for Summary Judgment: 
1. Sanderson's employment background with 
First Security Leasing Company; 
2. The reasons for Sanderson's hospitali-
zation; 
3. The number of days Sanderson missed 
from work because of his illness; and 
4. The individual who replaced Sanderson 
and the date of such replacement. 
Therefore, the concern of Sanderson, and of the court in 
Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), upon which Sanderson relies, that the court 
did not have the relevant deposition pages before it when it 
decided the motion, is simply unfounded. The relevant evidence 
from Sanderson's deposition was before the district court when it 
decided the motion for summary judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, First Security respectfully 
requests that the Court affirm the district court's summary 
judgment and order. 
DATED this 1^ » day of December, 1990. 
NEBEKER 
let Hugie Smith 
Rick L. Rose 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
RLR+402 
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a Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
\ Case No. 900254 
1 Priority 16 
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sor or appropriate man^c i . n > w ...^ .,_, 
->ening, you may be considered for advancement. 
employment Duration 
7* mployment with First Security is "at will" employment 
_j and is, therefore, not for any fixed period of time your 
nployment with First Security is at the will and discretion 
f First Security and may be terminated at any time by First 
ecunty or by you ;LS an employee. 
DN THE JOB 
Working Status 
Employees are classified as full-time, part-time, or tem-porary. Full and part-time employment means that you 
ire scheduled to work a certain number of hours each work 
week, subject to the company's discretion. Temporary 
employment is for a specified period or in a job on an inter-
mittent basis. The extent of participation in the First Security 
benefits program is based on your employment status. 
In addition, the federal Fair Labor Standard Act classifies 
employees into two general categories based on requirements 
for minimum wages and overtime compensation: 
a. "Exempt" includes executives, professional, 
administrative employees and certain sales represen-
tatives as defined by the U.S. Department of l-abor. 
b. "Nonexempt" includes all other employees. 
If you are considered a nonexempt employee, you are 
covered under the provisions of the Act and are eligible for 
overtime pay when applicable. 
Working Hours 
T he number of hours worked, start, and completion times differ throughout the organization. Your supervisor will 
explain the working hours in your office. First Security's 
standard work week is from 12:01 a.m. Sunday to midnight 
Saturday. 
Report of Hours Worked 
N onexempt employees are responsible for recording on a time sheet the hours worked each day. Please record 
your time in and out to the nearest five minutes Time 
6 
Luncnmreajs. rcuwu-o 
S ince First Security is open continuously during the work-ing day, lunch and break periods are scheduled on a stag-
gered basis in most offices. The length of the scheduled 
lunch period varies throughout the organization to suit the 
needs of the office. Lunch periods, however, may not be less 
than 30 minutes. Morning and afternoon break periods of 15 
minutes each are provided. The lunch period is not time 
worked, but the break periods are included as work time. 
Your supervisor will explain the scheduling of lunch and 
break periods for your department or office 
Dress P(5licy 
F irst Security's dress and grooming policy is a business standard that avoids extremes in fashions and hairstyles. 
We have responded to changes in fashion, modifying the 
accepteel standards of appropriate business dress to include 
more variety^ inrCQlors, styles, .textures and lines, and we will 
continue to do so. The financial services industry has 
historically expected employees to dress conservatively and 
moderately, and this philosophy stili applies. Your supervisor 
or the Human Resources Division will be happy to answer 
any questions you might have regarding appropriate dress 
and grooming standards. Inappropriate dress will result in 
counseling by your supervising officer or manager. 
Personal Data 
Be sure that your personnel records are correct and up to date. Please notify your local personnel officer of any 
changes in your marital status, number of dependents, home 
address or telephone number. If you have furthered your 
education or received any special honors or recognitions, 
wed like to know. 
Changes in dependent medical insurance coverage must 
be reported within 30 days to the Benefits Department. 
Personal Telephone Calls/Mail 
F irst Security's telephone system plays an important part in the conduct of daily business. While you may make or 
receive essential local personal calls, habitual use of the 
7 
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PER-oi R J/M 
First 
Security 
Standards 
For 
Employee 
Conduct 
First Security Corporation 
AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES 
Conflict of Interest 20 
Business Ventures 20 
Investments 20 
Margin Accounts 21 
Repossessions 21 
Retired or Obsolete Company Property 21 
Confidential Information 22 
Borrowing from Customers and Employees ,. 22 
Account Relationships ' 22 
Lending to Relatives 23 
Use of First Security Letterhead' 23 
Trust Group Rules 24 
Outside Employment 26 
Insurance, Real Estate Investments , 
Other Employment 26 
Officership, Directorship or Partnership 
of Outside Concerns • 27 
Church, Charitable, Fraternal or Civic 
Activities 27 
Fees 27 
Fiduciary Appointments 28 
Employment in Securities Business 28 
Contr ibutions 30 
Political Contr ibutions 30 
Civic, Religious, Charitable Contributions 30 
Employee Contr ibutions 30 
Employee Responsibilities 31 
Use of Microcomputers 32 
Equal Employment Oppor tun i ty Statement 33 
A Summary of Offenses Under Federal Banking Laws 34 
Employee Compliance with Standards 35 
Statement of Compliance 35 
Exceptions to Standards • 35 
Pre-Existing Violations of Standards 35 
Employee Appeal Process 36 
4 
GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY 
First Security's reputation for honesty, integrity, and safety is the 
sum of the personal reputations of its employees. First Security 
depends upon the talents and efforts of its employees for its 
excellent performance. 
First Security Standards for Employee Conduct is intended to govern 
your actions and working relationships with customers, fellow 
employees, competitors, government representatives, 
communications media, or any one else by whom you may be 
identified as an employee of First Security. Furthermore, what you 
are prohibited from doing under these standards shall not be done, 
or knowingly permitted to be done indirectly, through relatives 
friends, or otherwise. 
There may be occasions when First Security must change rules 
or give current rules a different interpretation than previously 
made. First Security has the right to modify policies, both written 
and unwritten. The language used in these standards is not 
intended to create, nor is it to be construed as, a contract between 
First Security and any or all of its employees. 
Employment with First Security is "at will" employment and is, 
therefore, not for any fixed period of time. Your employment with 
First Security is at the will and discretion of First Security and may 
be ended at any time by First Security or by you as' an employee. 
The terms "First Security" and "Company", as used in these 
standards, mean First Security Corporation and each of its 
subsidiary companies. The term "employees" includes all full and 
part-time employees of First Security Corporation and each of i' 
subsidiary companies. The term "senior management" denotes the 
position of senior vice president or higher. 
In many situations involving ethical or moral judgments, it may 
be difficult to determine the correct course of action. In such 
instances, you are not required to rely solely on vour own judgment 
but are encouraged to discuss the matter in full with your 
supervisor. Full disclosure of the facts in timely fashion to proper 
authority, with resulting approval, will always serve to meet your 
responsibilities with respect to these standards. 
5 
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Corporation 
rfNDMJIlMDIAHl (OMI 'AMI ' . 
NAME J ^ ^ ^ EMPLOYEE NUMBER 
0 F I : J C E / D E P A R T M E N ' C ^ ^ ^ ^ 4 ^ ^ ^ - f e ^ 
I certify that: 
1) 1 have fully read and understand First Security Standards for Employee Conduct, PER-91; and 
2) 1 am aware that compliance with these Standards is a condition of my employment; and 
3) I am in compliance with these Standards i^nd have no exceptions that have not previously been reported 
except the following. (Enter below any matters which should be reported that are not already on 
record If none, enter "None.") 
^&^&&££ x^U^^o 
» Employee's Signature Dace 
Supervisor's Review: 
To my knowledge, the above employee is in compliance with First Security Standards for Employee Conduct, Form 
PER-91, and has reported any matters required to be on record. 
Security 
Corporation 
Z ^ ^ S ^ ^ 2 ± L EMPLOYEE NUMBER sJAME 
I certify that: 
1) 1 have fully read and understand First Security Standards for Employee Conduct, PER-91; and 
2) 1 am aware that compliance with these Standards is a condition of my employment; and 
3) 1 am in compliance with these Standards and have no exceptions that have not previously been reported 
except the following: (Enter below any matters which should be reported that are not already on 
record. Jf nonelycntcr "None.") 
^o^^^yO^ 
zc -*&*&> 
Employee's Signature Dace 
upervisor's Review: 
To my knowledge, the above employee is in compliance with First Security Standards for Employee Conduct, Form 
'ER-91, and has reported any matters required to be on record. 
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FIRST SECURITY BANKS 
O P E R A T I N G P R O C E D U R E S 
SUBJECT: 
OP 6 - E-TJ p 1 oye e Re 1a1 1 o i i s 
Employee R e l a t i o n s and T e r m i n a t i o n s 
M anao ina fo r Imorovement Procedure 
[iNi IMBER 
I i \ o z,_ c •":) 
PACE 
L 
UATTS 
NOV 1 2 1552 ! 
PCLIC I 
1 Ff rst Secur i t y fo l l ows the Hanaoing foi lintproYement Procedure as a 
gu ide l i ne for d i s c i p l i n a r y ac t ion takei i by management for all I Fi p, r Vecurr.v 
Employees ( o f f i c e r / n o n - o f f i c e r ) . 
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY THE MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE 
2, 7ne Managing for Improvement Procedure I < t H *:r de*1 wi th two d i s t i n c t 
types of d i s c i p l i n a r y problems 
(a ' -~ forma n<. m f" * f n p r f n n ; n r o c - a n H a r - H * 
( b ) r-ol i c y V i o l a t i o n : 
DOCUMENTING THc HAWAGIHG FOR IMPR0YEMEN1 PROCEDURE 
"~ r u m e n t a t f on I s d e s c r i b e d 
•2 t i c n S e r i e s , Employment Piraet 
11 i "'II'YII 1 uITIf " ! hi1 Pf r sonnp 1 
Documentation at the informal stage fs not re ta ined in the Employe 
Personnel F i l e , 
(b) D o c u n e n t a t i o n a t the fo rmal s tage is r e t a i n e d in the Dnpl o i *• • 
Ptrsonnel F i l l ! 
MANAGING >W 1KPRUYEMLNI PROCEDURE 
(a) Informal Stage - The Informal stage i s used to address i n 11ia 1 job 
per tonnance/pol i cy v i o l a t i o n problems. 
f3 ) D i s c u s s t h e s i t u a t i o n w i t h the enploye 
employee and work, together tc - d t r e m n n f i 
p rob lems. 
(2 ) I f a j o b performance prob 1 em 
has had s u f f i c i e n t t r a i n i n g . 
EXHIBI' 
J s t e n t c the 
*~- apparent 
) f me employee 
fDJEFENDANT^S: 
OP 6-5 .? 
\TAG* 
2 
^ NOV 1 6 g f f i 
MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE (COOT) 
12) If a pol icy v i o l a t i o n has occurred, determine i f the employee 
understands work ru le s /po l i cy . 
(4) Discuss appropriate behavior with the employee. Make sure 
that the employee understands what i s expected and tne 
conseouences for repeated v i o l a t i o n . 
(b) Formal Stage - The formal stage i s used to r e c t i f y job 
perrormance/pol icy v io la t ion problems which have not been resolved 
at the informal s t a g e . Use of the formal stage i s also appropriate 
i f the employee f a l l s into a pattern of repeated v i o l a t i o n af ter 
showing a short term change in behavior as a result of involvement 
in tne informal s t a g e . 
( i ) Job Performance Problems: 
(A) When informal action i s i n e f f e c t i v e , prepare a plan for 
improvement with the employee. • Describe the behavioral 
change reouired, time frame a l lo t ted for improvement, and 
conseouences result ing frcm fai lure to improve, which may 
include prooation, suspension, or salary review. 
(3) If the employee does not improve performance within the 
a l l o t t e d time frame, place the employee on probation for 
a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days. 
(C) If the employee does not improve performance during the 
probationary period, terminate the employee in accordance 
with bank/subsidiary pol icy . 
(21 Policy Violation Problems: 
(A) Prepare a written warning for the employee when informal 
discussion of a policy violation has been inef fect ive . 
Include i record of events,, behavior that violated the 
work rule /pol icy, and the conseouences resulting from 
repeated violat ion. 
(B) If v iolat ions continue after a written warning, suspend 
the employee for a period of one to three days without 
pay. 
(C) If v iolat ions occur after the suspension, terminate the 
employee. 
PAGc 
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TE3MHATI0H GUIDELINES 
5 . Suspens i o n s / t e r m l n a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g frcm t h i s p rocedure ai e wu oe 
approved by t:i te 011 v 1 s*ion/Suos1d1ary Head Off ice 
6 Ii i si tuations w hei c enpl oyee behavior warrants 'immediate terai na tioi i the 
stages of this process do not -need to be followed. Termination in "these 
cases must be approved by the appropriate Dlvision/Subsidlarj Head. Office. 
CCHPEHSA7I0H GUIDELINES 
7. Employees involved in the formal stage of the procedure are n: ", e M r i t l e 
for job announcements (where applicable), and salary 1ncrear.p' 
